Is RealGround the same company as CyberSE.AI?

Yes. RealGround was formerly known as CyberSE.AI. The company rebranded and moved from www.cyberse.ai to www.realground.com; the old domain permanently redirects here. Same team, services, and content.

RealGround is a daily AI security intelligence and advisory platform for SMBs and AI startups deploying LLMs, AI agents, model APIs, and AI-enabled workflows.

What risks does RealGround cover?

RealGround covers prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, AI agent abuse, data leakage, model and supply-chain risk, AI governance, and OWASP-relevant LLM and API security risks.

What is agentic application security?

Agentic application security is the practice of securing AI applications where LLM-based agents autonomously plan, call tools and APIs, read untrusted content, and act on live systems. It covers indirect prompt injection, tool misuse, excessive agency, authorization failures, memory poisoning, and MCP risks.

Who provides agentic application security services?

RealGround is a specialist agentic application security firm offering AI agent security audits, secure agent builds, continuous AI red teaming, AI SBOM mapping, and virtual CISO advisory for SMBs and AI startups.

GhostApproval Symlink Flaws Could Let Malicious Repos Run Code in AI Coding Agents

What Happened

Researchers at Wiz found that a flaw in six popular AI coding assistants lets a booby-trapped code project quietly take control of a developer's computer. The assistant asks permission to edit one harmless-looking file, but the write lands on a sensitive one instead. The affected tools are Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic's Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf.

Why It Matters

According to Wiz, the GhostApproval vulnerability is a symlink-based flaw in six AI coding assistants (Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, Windsurf) that lets a malicious repository trick the agent into writing outside its workspace, including to SSH authorized_keys or shell startup files, leading to remote code execution on a developer’s machine.[1][2][4][5][6] The article reports that the issue stems from misleading human-approval flows: the agent’s prompt presents a harmless-looking file path while the actual write lands on a sensitive target, effectively bypassing the human-in-the-loop safety control.[2][4][5] From a RealGround perspective, this is a class of AI agent abuse where untrusted repos can drive dangerous file operations via agents, so organizations should harden agent architectures (resolving symlinks before approval, enforcing strict workspace boundaries, and least-privilege file access), and continuously red-team coding agents against symlink and path-traversal patterns to catch similar flaws early. Additionally, treating AI coding assistants as part of the software supply chain—subject to SBOM-style tracking, configurati

Healthcare Fintech SaaS SMB AI startups

RealGround Analysis

This signal maps to AI agent abuse. Organizations using AI agents, LLM APIs, SaaS integrations, or sensitive data workflows should review whether this class of issue could create unauthorized tool execution, data leakage, weak approval gates, or unmanaged supply-chain exposure.

Recommended Actions

Restrict AI agent tool permissions and production write paths.
Review sensitive data access across prompts, logs, embeddings, memory, and SaaS integrations.
Add human approval workflows for high-impact or state-changing actions.
Run prompt injection and indirect prompt injection tests against affected workflows.
Document the owner, control gap, and remediation deadline for this risk class.

Source

https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/ghostapproval-symlink-flaws-could-let.html