What Happened
The bug was simple: the login let you choose where your sign-in code went. Proving it on a live website was the hard part. TL;DR During an authorized assessment, an AI pentesting agent found a critical authentication bypass on a major insurer's production website, on its own. One login request let the user choose where the one-time passcode went. The attack was the easy part. Proving it
Why It Matters
During an authorized assessment, an AI pentesting agent independently identified a critical OTP authentication bypass on a major insurer’s production website: the login flow allowed the requested delivery channel and address to be changed, sending the code to an attacker-controlled inbox.[1] The agent stopped after confirming successful login, and the issue was reported to the insurer.[1] RealGround analysis: AI agents operating against production systems require strict authorization boundaries, guardrails, and business-logic testing to prevent harmful validation activity; the underlying flaw also warrants server-side binding of OTP delivery to the registered account.
RealGround Analysis
This signal maps to AI agent abuse. Organizations using AI agents, LLM APIs, SaaS integrations, or sensitive data workflows should review whether this class of issue could create unauthorized tool execution, data leakage, weak approval gates, or unmanaged supply-chain exposure.
Recommended Actions
- Restrict AI agent tool permissions and production write paths.
- Review sensitive data access across prompts, logs, embeddings, memory, and SaaS integrations.
- Add human approval workflows for high-impact or state-changing actions.
- Run prompt injection and indirect prompt injection tests against affected workflows.
- Document the owner, control gap, and remediation deadline for this risk class.
Source
https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/an-ai-agent-found-critical-otp-bypass.html
