What Happened
Three researchers at the security firm Hacktron used Anthropic's Claude Opus 5 to chain two flaws and take over the ChatGPT and Codex accounts of several OpenAI employees, then reach an internal OpenAI code repository. The chain began with a bug in the software that runs OpenAI's public help forum and moved through a weakness in OpenAI's own login system. This was security research,
Why It Matters
Fact: Researchers at Hacktron used Anthropic's Claude Opus 5 to help chain two vulnerabilities—one in OpenAI’s public help forum software and another in OpenAI’s login system—to compromise ChatGPT and Codex accounts of several OpenAI employees and reach an internal code repository. Fact: The incident was conducted as security research, demonstrating how AI tools can be leveraged to discover and exploit complex, multi‑step weaknesses in an AI provider’s broader SaaS and identity infrastructure. RealGround analysis: This highlights AI supply chain risk, where third‑party platforms, support forums, and identity systems around AI products become a critical attack surface that can be systematically probed and chained using powerful models. RealGround analysis: Organizations operating AI systems should treat all surrounding web apps, auth flows, and internal repos as part of their AI attack surface, and apply continuous red teaming plus formal supply‑chain and SBOM oversight to identify and fix chained vulnerabilities before they are exploitable.
RealGround Analysis
This signal maps to AI supply chain. Organizations using AI agents, LLM APIs, SaaS integrations, or sensitive data workflows should review whether this class of issue could create unauthorized tool execution, data leakage, weak approval gates, or unmanaged supply-chain exposure.
Recommended Actions
- Restrict AI agent tool permissions and production write paths.
- Review sensitive data access across prompts, logs, embeddings, memory, and SaaS integrations.
- Add human approval workflows for high-impact or state-changing actions.
- Run prompt injection and indirect prompt injection tests against affected workflows.
- Document the owner, control gap, and remediation deadline for this risk class.
Source
https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/claude-opus-5-helped-researchers-take.html
